Childhood, Interrupted: Encouraging the De-Institutionalization of Utah\u27s State Hospital by Montoya, Sara
Utah OnLaw: The Utah Law Review Online Supplement
Volume 2012 Article 1
2012
Childhood, Interrupted: Encouraging the De-
Institutionalization of Utah's State Hospital
Sara Montoya
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/onlaw
Part of the Disability Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Juvenile Law
Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah OnLaw: The Utah
Law Review Online Supplement by an authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.
Recommended Citation
Montoya, Sara (2012) "Childhood, Interrupted: Encouraging the De-Institutionalization of Utah's State Hospital," Utah OnLaw: The




CHILDHOOD, INTERRUPTED: ENCOURAGING  




In the long term, institutionalization in early childhood increases the 
likelihood that impoverished children will grow into psychiatrically 
impaired and economically unproductive adults.1 
 
This bold statement summarizes the findings reported in an article coauthored 
by four pediatric physicians about the detrimental and long-lasting effects of 
placing children in institutional care. This theory is neither contentious nor 
revolutionary. And it is by no means a well-kept secret, guarded by the psychiatric 
and medical elite against discovery by policy makers on Capitol Hill. On the 
contrary, advocacy groups, lawmakers, even former President George W. Bush 
have all been made sharply aware of the findings on institutionalized care. The 
former president even took steps during his presidency toward finding solutions to 
the problem of institutionalization.2 This attitude shift occurred largely in response3 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,4 which interpreted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to include protection for mentally ill 
populations from unnecessary inpatient treatment, and calling it unlawful 
discrimination to segregate such persons from society.5 
A new approach to children’s mental health care arose from this attitude shift, 
with policymakers implementing community-based and in-home interventions to 
treat children and families together. Such interventions are not only highly 
effective and much less degrading to the integrity of the family and child; they are 
also significantly more cost efficient. This is not surprising—common sense 
informs us that bringing the therapeutic tools of a hospital setting into the home 
and transferring those skills from professional caretakers to parents is, 
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1 Deborah A. Frank, Perri E. Klass, Felton Earls & Leon Eisenberg, Infants and 
Young Children in Orphanages: One View from Pediatrics and Child Psychiatry, 97 
PEDIATRICS 569, 569 (1996). 
2 See President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, Exec. Order No. 
13,263, 3 C.F.R. § 233–35 (2003) (declaring the mission of the newly created Commission 
to be “to recommend improvements to enable . . . children with serious emotional 
disturbances to live, work, learn, and participate fully in their communities”). 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
5 Id. at 598–602. 
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metaphorically speaking, teaching a man to fish. Thus, investing in in-home 
programming comes with the added bonus that eventually the taxpayer no longer 
needs to continue providing “fish.” Successful outcomes emerging from more 
recent deinstitutionalization efforts around the country are proving this logic to be 
true. This paradigm shift has been slower to reach Utah, in part due to two 
particularly alarming practices that continue to find support in the state: 1) the 
continued funding of long-term inpatient stays at the Utah State Hospital, 
compounded by the extensive investment in a building construction project at the 
hospital that was recently approved by the Utah State Legislature, and 2) pushing 
parents to relinquish custody as a method of obtaining Medicaid funding for 
treatment. 
This Note presents two possible litigation strategies advocates may utilize in 
an attempt to compel the state to cease these practices and to incentivize policy 
makers to implement systemic change more aggressively. First, Part I examines the 
Supreme Court decision in Olmstead, wherein the practice of unnecessary 
institutionalization in a psychiatric hospital was held to be a violation of the ADA. 
The decision provided strong language suggesting not only that passive allowance 
of such practices is unlawful discrimination, but also that a state has an affirmative 
obligation to take reasonable steps to find and implement alternatives to 
institutionalized care.6 Part II goes on to apply this holding and its precedent to the 
state’s practice of providing long-term institutionalization at the Utah State 
Hospital. Further, Part II also discusses the Utah State Legislature’s recent 
approval of $25 million in funding to be used in part to rebuild the hospital’s 
children’s wing—and the strong implications that allocating extensive state 
resources toward further institutionalization will have for the Olmstead analysis. 
This section concludes by urging that action be brought against the state for this 
continued unlawful practice of affirmatively investing in continued 
institutionalization, thus pushing the state to better allocate its funds toward 
implementing more community-based programs. 
Next, Part III analyzes the possible due process challenge that could be 
brought against the state for its complacency in the practice of custody 
relinquishment. This section will first examine the New York decision in Joyner v. 
Dumpson,7 where a plaintiff’s class of nearly 5,000 children challenged New 
York’s custody relinquishment scheme under the due process clause.8 While a 
conclusion as to the results of such a challenge is highly fact-dependent, a number 
of factors put forth by the Joyner decision weigh heavily in favor of the right 
potential plaintiff who chooses to challenge the practice in Utah. A definitive 
conclusion in this respect is difficult to reach, but this Note argues that judicial 
leanings look favorable for a child or family who claims their family integrity was 
destroyed for want of in-home mental health services. 
																																																								
6 Id. at 601–03. 
7 Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983). 
8 Id. at 777. 
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Finally, this Note concludes that these two litigation strategies appear 
unfavorable for the state if challenges were brought against it, only strengthening 
an already compelling argument that progress must be made to promote more 
community and in-home children’s services. This long overdue paradigm shift is 
necessary not only to preserve our families and our children, but also to preserve 
and more shrewdly allocate Utah’s increasingly scarce state resources. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Besides the detrimental effects on the individual, institutionalized care is an 
affront to civil rights. Such care is a modern and less-recognizable form of 
segregation, separating mentally ill or disabled children and adults from the rest of 
the population under the guise of “rehabilitation.”  
The Supreme Court endorsed as much in its 1999 decision in Olmstead v. 
L.C.9 Analyzing institutionalization as a form of discrimination prohibited by the 
ADA, the Court pointed out that unjustified institutional placement constitutes a 
form of discrimination10 and “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so 
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.”11 The 
country took heed of this new category of discrimination and so began a movement 
of deinstitutionalization. 
Subsequent initiatives by state and federal legislation prompted the creation of 
various models of community-based systems of care.12 As programs sprouted and 
grew, so did research that demonstrated the efficacy of community-based treatment 
and integrated systems of care. In a report to Congress, the Center for Mental 
Health Services (CMHS) provided data about children in forty-five different 
community-based systems of care after eighteen months of receiving services.13 
CMHS reported, among other benefits, a reduction in behavioral and emotional 
problems, an increase in clinical functioning, an improvement in school 
performance and attendance, less law enforcement involvement, and lower 
caregiver strain.14 As the rest of the nation has continued to move toward a new 
system of integrated and community-based mental health care, Utah has resisted 
																																																								
9 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
10 Id. at 600. 
11 Id. 
12 See Donna Folkemer & Barbara Coleman, Long-term Care Reform: Legislative 
Efforts to Shift Care to the Community, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14479. 
13 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE COMPREHENSIVE 
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES PROGRAM: 
EVALUATION FINDINGS: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2004) [hereinafter SAMHSA 
REPORT], available at www.store.samhsa.gov/product/Comprehensive-Community-Mental 
-Health-Services-for-Children-and-Their-Families-Program-Evaluation-Findings-Annual-
Report-to-Congress-2004/SMA-CB-E2004. 
14 Id. at 30–36. 
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the movement. Utah is one of only two surveyed states15 that continue to fund the 
most restrictive level of care available: inpatient hospitalization.16 Furthermore, 
Utah spent $20 million on the second-most restrictive level of care—residential 
treatment—during the last legislative session.17 Not only are these levels of 
treatment the most costly methods of treating only very limited numbers of 
children, they contravene current research that demonstrates improved outcomes 
when service providers work with children and their families together.18 Utah 
would benefit both in treatment outcomes and in cost efficiency by moving away 
from these methods of care. 
A far cry from deinstitutionalization, the state of Utah has instead decided to 
further invest in inpatient care. In the 2009, the 2010, and the 2011 legislative 
sessions, the Utah State Hospital requested funding to construct two new 
buildings,19 one of which would house the children’s psychiatric wing.20 In 
February 2011, the hospital presented its request for $30,881,000 to the 
Infrastructure and General Government Subcommittee21 and in March was 
ultimately approved for a grant of $25,000,000.22 When discussing this proposal, it 
is also useful to discuss the subsequent cost of treating a child once the new 
building is completed. It was estimated in 2007 that a pediatric bed in the Utah 
State Hospital costs $439 per day, per child,23 accumulating over the course of a 
median stay of over thirteen months.24 Compare this with the estimate that the 
same level of care, when provided in a community-based program, can cost less 
																																																								
15 OFFICE OF THE UTAH LEGIS. AUDITOR GEN., REPORT TO THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 
NO. 2008–04, A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 37 (2008) 
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF USH], available at http://le.utah.gov/audit/08_ 
04rpt.pdf (reporting that out of seven western states surveyed, only Colorado and Utah 
reported having designated children’s beds at a state facility). 
16 DARCY GRUTTADARO ET AL., REINVESTING IN THE COMMUNITY: A FAMILY GUIDE 
TO EXPANDING HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 
9 (2009), available at http://www.namiut.org/inform-yourself/childrens-issues (follow 
“Reinvesting in the Community” hyperlink). 
17 Id.; Letter from Sherri D. Wittwer, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, to 
Utah Legislature (May 25, 2010) (on file with author). 
18 GRUTTADARO ET AL., supra note 16, at 9–10. 
19 Letter from Sherri D. Wittwer to Utah Legislature, supra note 17; PERFORMANCE 
AUDIT OF USH, supra note 15, at 38. 
20 PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF USH, supra note 15, at 38. 
21 OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. FISCAL ANALYST, CAPITAL DEVELOPMENTS: BUDGET BRIEF, 
GEN. SESS. 2 (2011) [hereinafter BUDGET BRIEF]. 
22 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63B-20-101(2)(c) (West 2011). 
23 BUDGET BRIEF, supra note 21, at 3. 
24 DIV. OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT ON 
PUBLIC SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN UTAH 101 (2005) 
[hereinafter DSAMH REPORT], available at http://www.dsamh.utah.gov/docs/fy2005 
report.pdf. 
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than half that of per-day institutional care,25 and does not require the $25 million 
starting price tag. With the legislative approval of this costly project, the state is 
wasting valuable funds on perpetuating the unlawful and drastically inefficient 
tradition of inpatient treatment that breaks up families. If the state faces pressure 
from legal action as proposed below, the project’s demise can act as a catalyst to 
more effectively allocate our state dollars and evolve to a more effective, dignified, 
and efficient system of care that will in turn build stronger families and 
communities. The following proposed legal challenges can act as the incentive for 
policymakers to progress toward modern theories of community-based care. These 
proposed litigation strategies seize on the national attitude shift that has begun 
creating a new way of thinking about the mentally ill. 
  
II.  CHALLENGING INSTITUTIONALIZED CARE  
AS A VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE ADA 
 
Of the most recent challenges to states’ failure to provide children and adults 
with alternatives to institutionalized care, the most successful have come in the 
form of claimed violations of Title II of the ADA. These challenges follow from 
the famous Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C., holding that, “the 
proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental 
disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions”26 when certain 
conditions are met. This decision prompted extensive chatter among advocacy 
groups at both a national and a local level. 
To offer only a few examples of the response generated by the decision, the 
Surgeon General in September 2000 hosted The Surgeon General’s Conference on 
Children’s Mental Health: Developing a National Action Agenda in Washington, 
DC.27 Similarly, in June 1999, legal advocates of persons with physical and mental 
disabilities met “to discuss the implications of the ruling”28 in Olmstead, as well as 
to develop recommended strategies for states to implement more community-based 
services to comply with the Court’s holding.29 Both of these meetings of minds 
reached a similar consensus: state resources—as well as local, state, and federal 
																																																								
25 Ashli J. Sheidow et al., Treatment Costs for Youths Receiving Multisystemic 
Therapy or Hospitalization After a Psychiatric Crisis, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 548 (May 
2004), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=88594. 
26 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
27 David Satcher, Report of the Surgeon General’s Conference on Children’s Mental 
Health: A National Action Agenda, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2000) 
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/cmh/ 
childreport.html. 
28 JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, UNDER COURT 
ORDER: THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN OLMSTEAD V. L.C., at Foreword (1999) 
[hereinafter UNDER COURT ORDER], available at http://www.bazelon.org/News-
Publications.aspx (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Olmstead” hyperlink). 
29 Id. 
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policy initiatives—ought to be centered around encouraging community 
integration of mental health care services whenever possible.30  
The Olmstead decision, as well as the commentary that ensued and the 
various challenges mental health advocates brought against states under its 
precedential authority, all endeavor to establish a standard by which states are able 
to gauge the extent of responsibility they owe to their mentally ill populations.31 
This section first discusses the opinion itself, and then examines the commentary 
and controversies that have shed further light on the implications of this decision 
for state mental health care systems. 
 
A.  The Opinion: Olmstead v. L.C. 
 
Olmstead v. L.C. began as a challenge brought by two women with 
intellectual disabilities against the state of Georgia.32 The women had been 
voluntarily admitted into care at the Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta and 
although their treatment professionals later concluded they were appropriate for 
further treatment in a community-based program, the women were not released—
purportedly due to inadequate funding of community services.33 
The district court ordered the state to place the women in a community-based 
program and held that “unnecessary institutional segregation of the disabled 
constitutes discrimination per se” under Title II of the ADA.34 To establish a claim 
under Title II, a plaintiff must show that 1) he or she is a person with a qualified 
disability, 2) he or she was excluded from participation or denied services, 
benefits, etc. of a public entity, and 3) this discrimination was the result of his or 
her disability.35 Further, Title II asserts that states are required to “administer 
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the 
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”36 This provision is limited in that 
																																																								
30 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 27; UNDER COURT ORDER, supra note 28, 
at 1. 
31 See, e.g., Terence Ng et al., Home and Community Based Services: Introduction to 
Olmstead Lawsuits and Olmstead Plans, UCSF NAT’L CTR. FOR PERS. ASSISTANCE 
SERVICES. (Aug. 2011), http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadcases.php; JUDGE 
DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MERGING SYSTEM OF CARE 
PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: OLMSTEAD PLANNING FOR CHILDREN WITH SERIOUS 
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE 2–4 (2001), available at http://www.bazelon.org/News-
Publications.aspx (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Olmstead” hyperlink); 
UNDER COURT ORDER, supra note 28. 
32 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999). 
33 Id. at 593–94. 
34 Id. at 594. 
35 See Ann K. Wooster, When Does a Public Entity Discriminate Against Disabled 
Individuals in Provision of Services, Programs, or Activities Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132, 163 A.L.R. FED. 339 (2000). 
36 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2010). 
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states are required to make “reasonable modifications” to their policies to avoid 
discriminatory practices.37 Also, a defense is available if the state can demonstrate 
that making such modifications would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the 
service or program.38  
Georgia claimed in its defense that the third element of the ADA claim—that 
the plaintiffs had been discriminated against because of their disability—had not 
been met. Georgia claimed that inadequate funding of community programs had 
been the reason for continued hospitalization, not discrimination by reason of their 
disability.39 Thus, the state asserted that without adequate funding, immediate 
transfers to community-based services would fundamentally alter the hospital’s 
program.40 
The district court rejected Georgia’s inadequate funding defense, finding that 
segregated treatment of the mentally disabled constitutes discrimination per se 
under the ADA and “cannot be justified by inadequate funding.”41 The court 
looked to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for this 
proposition, which had rejected a cost-based defense in an ADA claim filed by a 
nursing home patient.42 The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the patient and 
concluded that whenever a state chooses to provide services under the ADA, it 
must comport with its provisions—referring in particular to the provision that 
prohibits unnecessary segregation as a form of discrimination.43 
The district court then turned to Georgia’s claim that requiring an immediate 
transfer to community services would “fundamentally alter” the state’s programs. 
Most significantly, the court emphasized two specific facts in its analysis of the 
issue: first, that Georgia already had in place community services that were 
appropriate for the women, and second that providing care in an institutional 
setting is twice as costly as providing services in the community.44 The court used 
these facts to support its finding that Georgia would not have to fundamentally 
alter its program to provide community-based care in the face of its economic 
shortfalls.45 
On appeal, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
modified the district court’s analysis, affirming the lower court’s holding that 
treating the women in a segregated institution when they were appropriate for more 
																																																								
37 Id. § 35.130(b)(7) (requiring “reasonable modifications” to avoid discrimination, 
“unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity”). 
38 Id. 
39 L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, No. 1:95-CV-1210-MHS, 1997 WL 148674, at 
*3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *4. 
42 Id. (citing Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 1995)). 
43 Helen L., 46 F.3d at 333–39. 
44 Zimring, 1997 WL 148674, at *4 & n.4. 
45 Id. at *4. 
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integrated community-based treatment programs constituted discrimination under 
the ADA.46 However, the appellate court disapproved of the lower court’s broad 
rejection of a cost-based defense, expressing concern that the holding had 
essentially “ruled out” a lack of funding justification.47 The court did not wholly 
disagree with the district court’s conclusion; it instead specified that it was clear 
that Congress intended to permit a lack of funding defense, but only in “the most 
limited of circumstances.”48 In this way, the appellate court attempted to provide 
some protection for states to raise cost-based defenses. 
The court concluded that the cost-based defense ought to be upheld if it could 
be shown that ordering the state to transfer the two women to community-based 
programs would so impact Georgia’s strapped budget that it would constitute a 
“fundamental alteration” to the state’s programming.49 The court then remanded 
the case to the district court to determine whether this “fundamental alteration” 
finding could be made.50  
The court cited three factors to be considered in determining whether a state 
can establish a fundamental alteration: first, whether the costs of integrated 
services would be unreasonable in light of the demands of the state’s mental health 
budget.51 Second, whether it would be unreasonable to require states to use 
available Medicaid waiver slots.52 And third, whether any difference in the cost of 
institutional versus community-based care would lessen the state’s financial 
burden.53 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in 
substantial part.54 The Court agreed that unjustified institutionalization constitutes 
a form of unlawful discrimination prohibited under the ADA and must be remedied 
by states when it is reasonable in light of certain factors.55 The Court, however, 
disagreed on what factors to consider in making this reasonableness determination. 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence found the requirements for establishing a 
“fundamental-alteration” cost-based defense still too burdensome for a state to 
																																																								
46 L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1998). 
47 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 595 (1999) (citation omitted). 
48 Zimring, 138 F.3d at 902. 
49 Id. at 904–05. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. The court considered in some detail the availability of Medicaid waivers that 
allowed the state to spend Medicaid dollars to provide community-based care to those not 
eligible for institutionalized care. Id. at 904. These waivers, known as “Home and 
Community-based Services” (HCBS) waivers, are discussed in more detail infra Part 
II.B.3. 
53 Zimring, 138 F.3d at 904–05. 
54 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (affirming essential 
holding but concluding that the Eleventh Circuit had imposed an “unduly restrictive” 
remand instruction). 
55 Id. 
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meet if only considering the costs of care for two individuals against an entire 
state’s mental health budget.56 Such a showing would be virtually impossible for a 
state to make. Instead, Justice Ginsburg found it important to consider a state’s 
need to provide a multitude of services to the diverse population of mentally ill 
patients in its care.57 
Justice Ginsburg recognized that while the cost of community-based care is 
far lower than institutionalized care in a simple comparison of the two, the cost 
analysis when releasing individual patients to community programs is far more 
complicated.58 Instead—due in part to high overhead costs associated with running 
an inpatient program—the release of a few individual patients saves virtually no 
money for the state, while funding the community programs to which these 
patients are released actually causes additional expenditures for the state.59 This 
was essentially an attempt to protect each individual state’s right to choose how to 
administer its own programs, so long as reasonable efforts were made to encourage 
the most integrated and least discriminatory programming possible.60 
Justice Stevens, concurring separately, instead felt that determining 
reasonableness ought to be a question for the lower courts and would have 
preferred to simply affirm the court of appeals.61 This would permit courts to make 
a simple comparison of community-based treatment costs versus inpatient 
treatment costs per individual; a comparison that Justice Ginsburg recognized 
would leave virtually no cost-based defense to states. In this way, the standard set 
by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence actually provides more protection for state 
budgets and leaves plaintiffs with a bigger burden to meet. For this reason, the 
remainder of the analysis will consider the costs of the Utah State Hospital under 
the more demanding Ginsburg standard. 
 
B.  Potential Liability Theories in Utah 
 
Since the Olmstead decision, subsequent cases applying the Court’s analysis 
have highlighted determinative factors that may tip the scales in favor of a 
plaintiff, particularly when ruling on a state’s fundamental-alteration defense. For 
example, courts have rejected as defenses general fiscal problems faced by the 
state and the argument that modifying services to fit a community rather than a 
																																																								
56 Id. at 605 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
57 Id. at 605–06. 
58 See id. at 606 (recognizing that limited availability and waiting lists for community 
programs complicate the cost analysis). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 605 (“To maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with an even 
hand, the State must have more leeway than the courts below understood the fundamental-
alteration defense to allow.”). 
61 Id. at 607 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
82 UTAH ONLAW [NO. 1 
hospital context will fundamentally alter programming.62 Conversely, states are 
able to avoid liability if they are able to demonstrate they have a plan to reduce 
institutionalization and have made “sufficient efforts” to implement that plan, such 
as increasing the use of Medicaid waivers, budgeting for community programming, 
using waiting lists to transition patients, planning new facilities, or reducing 
institutionalization rates.63  
Besides lawsuits, Olmstead prompted waves of innovative programming and 
funding solutions across the country for both the mentally disabled and mentally ill 
populations alike. Children’s mental health services have been part of this 
movement, with cases both past and current being brought by advocacy groups 
against states to enforce implementation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in this 
unique setting.64 Utah has thus far avoided any major litigation over its children’s 
mental health inpatient services, or its lack of comprehensive community-based 
programming. Viewed under the standards set forth in Olmstead, as well as in 
subsequent cases brought under the Olmstead precedent,65 the state of Utah is 
highly vulnerable to litigation by advocacy groups or families due to its slow pace 
in developing a comprehensive system of community-based mental health services, 
as well as its continued practice of treating children at the Utah State Hospital. 
This section details three specific factors that would likely tip a court in favor of a 
plaintiff bringing an Olmstead complaint against the state of Utah. 
 
1.  Legislative Approval of a Costly New Children’s Wing at the Utah State 
Hospital 
 
In 2011, the Utah Legislature approved the Utah State Hospital’s request to 
for $25 million in funding to build a new facility to house the children’s wing of 
the psychiatric hospital. This construction project modifies the analysis such that 
Utah may be more vulnerable to claims that it is in violation of the ADA. 
Under the least restrictive construction of a state’s obligations under Title II 
of the ADA, a state must show that it would be an inequitable allocation of its 
mental health resources to expend funds providing court-ordered services for 
																																																								
62 See Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003); 
Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003). 
63 See ARC of Washington State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Wasserman, 164 
F.Supp.2d 591 (D.Md. 2001). 
64 See, e.g., Katie A. v. Bonta, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Katie A. ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles County, 481 F.3.d 1150 (9th Cir. 
2007); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1–4, J.B. v. Barbour (S.D. Miss. 
2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00153-HTW-LRA). 
65 See TERENCE NG, ALICE WONG & CHARLENE HARRINGTON, UCSF NAT’L CTR. FOR 
PERS. ASSISTANCE SERVICES, HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES: COMMUNITY 
INTEGRATION – OLMSTEAD AND OLMSTEAD-RELATED LAWSUITS, at tbl. 2 (Aug. 2011), 
available at http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadcases.php. 
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individual plaintiffs to the detriment of services provided for other mentally 
disabled persons in the state.66 However, even with this interpretation of states’ 
obligations as being minimal, the Court held that segregated and highly restrictive 
treatment programs ought to be minimized as much as is reasonably possible, as 
such programs are nonetheless unlawful discrimination prohibited by the ADA.67  
To determine whether a state has minimized undesirable programming as 
much as reasonably possible, a court takes into account the resources available to 
the state, and looks for state attempts to make and implement a plan to decrease 
institutionalization.68 Applying such a standard to the recent funds allocated to 
rebuild the Utah State Hospital, one would be hard pressed to argue that Utah is 
maximizing its budget to implement new community-based services or has 
formulated a plan to do so. Contrary to “reasonably possible,” it seems instead 
entirely unreasonable to expend $25 million to further fund programming that the 
Court is demanding be minimized. And while courts recognize states’ needs to 
maintain lightly populated institutions while implementing the necessary 
programming, this caveat is largely inapplicable where, ten years after Olmstead, 
the Hospital continues to treat a disproportionately small population of children for 
such an unreasonable length of time. 
While Justice Ginsburg in Olmstead looked at calculations of overhead costs 
for institutions and pointed out the high cost of running even a very lightly 
populated institution, she made the case that a state need not expend additional 
funds it does not have in attempting to comply with court orders, even though such 
a scheme would be more cost efficient over time.69 The purpose of this, however, 
was not to allow states an open-ended and indefinite lack of funding defense. 
Rather, when Justice Ginsburg permitted this limited defense for states, her 
intention was to allow states leeway to administer services at their own discretion, 
but with the caveat that states must not passively allow segregated services to 
continue without making an effort to slowly implement more integrated treatment 
options.70 Allocating more state dollars to rebuild the inpatient facilities, rather 
than using these newfound dollars to implement community-based programs, 
seems to blatantly disregard the “reasonably possible” standard. 
As the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law argues, states must work at 
developing comprehensive community programs to reduce unnecessary 
institutionalization in order to be in compliance with the ruling.71 As far as 
																																																								
66 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Sensibly construed, the 
fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications regulation would allow 
the State to show that, in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the 
plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the 
care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities.”). 
67 See id. at 607. 
68 Id. at 597 (majority opinion). 
69 See id. 
70 Id. at 604–06 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
71 UNDER COURT ORDER, supra note 28, at 1. 
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resources go, Bazelon argues that the decision suggests that state reallocation of 
resources may be compelled: “states need to look both at services that are currently 
funded and at how community services might be funded if the state took action to 
maximize its budget.”72 With the State Hospital’s new grant acting to maximize the 
state’s budget to fund more inpatient services, the door may be open for a plaintiff 
to argue that these resources ought to be used to fund integrated treatment options 
that comply with the ADA and Olmstead. Such an extensive allocation of 
resources demonstrates more than a passive allowance of continued discrimination 
of children with mental illness. 
Finally, the recently allocated funds may be generally problematic as applied 
to the fundamental-alteration defense factors discussed above. They demonstrate 
Utah’s commitment to maintaining segregated care, undermine any fiscal defense 
that could be offered by the state, and suggest that the state is actually doing the 
opposite of formulating and implementing a plan to decrease segregated care. 
 
2.  Length-of-Stay Analysis 
 
A second factor that would potentially weigh significantly in an ADA 
challenge against the state of Utah is the average length of a child’s stay in the 
Utah State Hospital. While the Olmstead decision does not discuss the length of 
hospitalization in its analysis, it clearly prohibits “unnecessary” 
institutionalization.73 Such language may open the door for arguments criticizing 
the “necessity” of excessively long periods of institutionalization. If such 
arguments are to be successful, they will very likely succeed in a case against the 
state of Utah, due to very excessive lengths of stay reported for children in the 
Utah State Hospital. 
In 2005, the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health (DSAMH) 
issued a report on public substance abuse and mental health services in Utah. In the 
report, DSAMH calculated the median length of stay for children aged six to 
thirteen in the Utah State Hospital at 419 days.74 Compare this number to the 
average length of stay at the only other western state facility that designates 
children’s psychiatric beds, Colorado.75 Colorado reported an average length of 
stay for children aged zero to twelve of approximately eleven days.76 This is 
significantly shorter than those reported in Utah. Further, the median length of stay 
for “youth,” or children aged thirteen to eighteen, in the Utah State Hospital was 
																																																								
72 Id. at 3. 
73 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597 (“Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly recognized 
as discrimination based on disability.”). 
74 DSAMH REPORT, supra note 24, at 101. 
75 PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF USH, supra note 15, at 37. 
76 COLO. MEDICAID CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. PROGRAM, FY 2009-2010 
VALIDATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR ACCESS BEHAVIORAL CARE, at D-3 tbl. D-
4 (2010) [hereinafter COLORADO REPORT]. 
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218 days,77 versus Colorado’s average of approximately ten days for adolescent 
children aged thirteen to seventeen.78 
These dramatically higher numbers in the state of Utah may be open to a 
challenge on “necessity” grounds. The ever-growing body of research 
demonstrating that community-based interventions—even for children who qualify 
for inpatient levels of care—are as effective or more effective than costly and 
harmful institutionalized care only strengthens these arguments.79 With such 
effective interventions available, it becomes less and less likely that a court will be 
sufficiently convinced of the necessity of a child’s thirteen-month stay in a highly 
segregated institution so as to dismiss an ADA challenge. 
 
3.  Lack of Use of Medicaid Waivers to Help Fund Community-Based Services 
 
The Supreme Court noted in its decision that Georgia failed to take full 
advantage of the Medicaid waivers available to it to fund the provision of services 
in community-based programs.80 The waivers make available federal funds for 
children who might not otherwise qualify for certain Medicaid funds.81 The idea 
behind these waivers is to allow Medicaid dollars that would eventually go toward 
funding an institutional stay to instead go to pay for more integrated, and 
preventative, services.82 
The Court pointed out specifically that “by 1996, ‘HHS approved up to 2109 
waiver slots for Georgia, but Georgia used only 700’” and cited this statistic in 
support of its assertion that the federal government encourages states to provide 
more community-based treatment programs.83 
When applying the Court’s language, evidence of a failure to access these 
funds would strongly support a plaintiff’s assertion that a state had not made 
reasonable modifications to its programs so as to accommodate treatment needs in 
the community, in compliance with the ADA. Specifically, when “taking into 
																																																								
77 DSAMH REPORT, supra note 24, at 96, 101. 
78 COLORADO REPORT, supra note 76. 
79 See SAMHSA REPORT, supra note 13 (reporting the findings of forty-five 
community-based systems of care and concluding that changes occurred among children 
with severe emotional disturbances who utilized these services); see also supra text 
accompanying note 13. 
80 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999). 
81 Rebecca G.W. Random, Note, Custody Relinquishment to Obtain Mental Health 
Services, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 475, 484 (2005). 
82 Id. at 484–85. 
83 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601. “Indeed, the United States points out that the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) ‘has a policy of encouraging States to 
take advantage of the waiver program, and often approves more waiver slots than a State 
ultimately uses.’” Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring at 25–26, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-
536), 1999 WL 149653 at *26). 
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account the resources available to the state,”84 such evidence of unused waiver 
slots would support a finding that valuable resources had gone ignored. Thus, 
ignoring resources that would be capable of supporting community treatment 
programs would not be in compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate that 
unnecessary institutionalization must be addressed by state action to make any 
reasonable modifications. 
To analyze Utah’s current practices with regard to Medicaid waivers, it may 
be best to compare and contrast with a state that has taken notable advantage of the 
federal waiver program available. While nearly every state has secured waivers to 
develop programs for the developmentally disabled, far fewer states have adopted 
the waiver for use in developing children’s mental health services.85 Only three 
states in 2005 had secured Medicaid waivers to support children’s mental health 
care programs: Kansas, New York, and Vermont.86 Kansas has made significant 
strides in its process of deinstitutionalization, in significant part through use of the 
Medicaid 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver.87 
Kansas first used the Medicaid HCBS waiver in 1997, after it shut down its 
children’s psychiatric hospital.88 The state has been able to successfully treat 
children requiring a hospital level of care through intensive home and community 
services, with success measured by factors such as a child’s permanent status at 
home, his or her school performance, and the level of involvement with juvenile 
justice.89 The state has further expanded its waiver program, and has seen the 
annual per-child cost of children’s mental health services decrease by more than 
half when compared to institutionalization costs per child.90 
Utah has entirely neglected to access such a waiver to alternatively fund 
community-based children’s mental health services, although it is eligible and 
would likely qualify for such a waiver.91 In the reasonable modifications analysis, 
this factor might tip a court in favor of finding Utah in violation of the ADA. 
																																																								
84 Id. at 607. 
85 NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF, FUNDING FOR 
CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: MAKING THE MOST OF MEDICAID 4 (2005) 
[hereinafter NGA ISSUE BRIEF] (on file with author). 
86 Id. 
87 See Random, supra note 81, at 484–85. 
88 NAT’L ALLIANCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS-UTAH, FACT SHEET, MEDICAID HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES WAIVER 1 [hereinafter MEDICAID WAIVER FACT SHEET], 
available at http://www.namiut.org/images/stories/HCBS_Fact_Sheet_5-10.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
89 Id. 
90 NGA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 85, at 5. 
91 MEDICAID WAIVER FACT SHEET, supra note 88, at 1 (“To qualify for the waiver, a 
state must show that it can serve children that require a hospital level of care with intensive 
services at home and in the community at a cost equal to or less than a hospital level of 
care. Most states find it challenging to qualify because they have closed their children’s 
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These three factors, either alone or taken together, may push a court to uphold 
an ADA challenge against the state of Utah, based on the current status of its 
children’s mental health care services. 
 
III.  CHALLENGING THE PRACTICE OF CUSTODY RELINQUISHMENT  
AS AN IMPINGEMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
 
An alternative litigation strategy to prompt state action in building 
community-based children’s mental health services arises from the state’s practice 
of requiring a parent to relinquish custody of their child to the state so their child 
can qualify for Medicaid services. This is a problem that nearly half of the states 
are currently battling or have struggled with in the past,92 and one that is widely 
affecting families who are currently accessing the mental health care system—or 
those who are contemplating doing so.93 
States have dealt with this practice in different ways. In 2003, three members 
of Congress requested a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
on the occurrence of custody relinquishment across the country.94 The GAO found 
that states widely diverged on this issue.95 In eleven states, statutory schemes 
allowed for voluntary placement of children in child welfare systems to access 
mental health care without requiring full custody relinquishment.96 In six states and 
the District of Columbia, statutes were in place that actively prohibited the 
																																																																																																																																												
psychiatric hospitals, however Utah would qualify because the state has cost data on 
serving children in a hospital setting.”). 
92 JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY, RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET 
CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS 1 (2000), available at http://www.bazelon.org/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=-hWbIbUX5v8%3d&tabid=104 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) 
(reporting that, in 2000, in roughly half of the states, an estimated one in four families 
seeking mental health services for their child was forced to relinquish custody to do so). 
93 See DARCY E. GRUTTADARO, THE TRAGEDY OF CUSTODY RELINQUISHMENT 
(1996), available at http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Legal/The_Tragedy 
_of_Custody_Relinquishment_-_NAMI_Legal_Center.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) 
(reporting on a 1999 NAMI survey that found that twenty percent of parent respondents to 
the study reported having relinquished custody to obtain services for their child). 
94 Press Release, Pete Stark, Collins, Stark, & Kennedy Release Report on Custody 
Sacrifices by Parents of Mentally Ill Children (Apr. 21, 2003), http://www.stark.house.gov/ 
(search site for “custody sacrifices”; or from home page follow “News” hyperlink, then 
“Press Releases” hyperlink; then “2003” hyperlink; then browse through pages to “21 
Apr”). 
95 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-397, CHILD WELFARE AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE: FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A STRONGER ROLE IN HELPING 
STATES REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PLACED SOLELY TO OBTAIN MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES 3 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. GAO REPORT]. 
96 Id. 
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practice.97 In the remaining states, there were no statutes addressing the issue at 
all.98 
While the GAO has issued no follow-up reports, the commissioners of the 
GAO report gave testimony at a Senate hearing suggesting that shortly after the 
report was released several more states moved to enact bans on custody 
relinquishment.99 Utah, however, has not addressed the issue through statute, either 
to prohibit the practice or to regulate it through voluntary placement schemes, and 
has made no future commitment to do so.100  
In a similarly silent manner, Utah keeps no data on the practice.101 No state 
agencies currently collect or track data about how often the decision is posed to 
families, or how often custody relinquishment is agreed to.102 However, both the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) in Utah and the Disability Law Center 
have received anecdotal reports of the practice.103 Also, common sense indicates 
that to be financing a costly stay in either residential treatment or the Utah State 
Hospital without much assistance from private health insurance,104 Utah families 
must be finding some way to qualify their children for public funds in order to 
meet the demands of such burdensome costs of high levels of treatment. 
Because this practice is the consequence of high costs of treatment too 
burdensome for most families, it is likely flourishing in the state of Utah. This is an 
expected result of the lengthy and costly stays in either the Utah State Hospital or 
residential treatment, as well as the corresponding lack of options for lower-cost 
community-based services. Further still, the lack of Medicaid waiver programs that 
would provide alternatives to some families seeking to keep their children at home 




99 Christine Lehmann, Bill Seeks to Reverse Trend of Parents Ceding Custody, 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 19, 2003, at 11, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/ 
content/38/18/11.2.full (reporting on testimony given that thirteen states had banned 
parental-custody relinquishment practices as of the date of the hearing). 
100 DISABILITY LAW CTR., BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: AN INVESTIGATION 
OF CUSTODY RELINQUISHMENT AS A METHOD FOR ACCESSING ESSENTIAL MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN IN UTAH 5 (2007) [hereinafter DLC INVESTIGATION], 
available at http://www.disabilitylawcenter.org/publications/Between% 
20a%20Rock%20and%20a%20Hard%20Place%20Jan%202007.pdf. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 4. 
104 See GRUTTADARO, supra note 93 (asserting that private health insurance policies 
place severe restrictions on benefits for the treatment of mental illnesses and is “not an 
option for families with a seriously mentally ill child”). 
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cost community-based options are often cited as an effective solution to the 
custody relinquishment problem.105 
Thus, the custody relinquishment scheme exists as a sort of subset problem of 
institutionalization, in tandem with other issues that are caused by the high costs of 
inpatient care and issues that cause custody relinquishment. As such, litigation 
strategies to address one may thereby address the other as a natural consequence. 
The following is an analysis of a potential substantive due process challenge to the 
practice of custody relinquishment in Utah. 
 
A.  The Opinion: Joyner v. Dumpson 
 
There is little precedent in the area of custody relinquishment challenges. 
Joyner v. Dumpson,106 arising out of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, appears to be the leading case providing guidance in analyzing a 
substantive due process claim that challenges custody relinquishment practices.107 
Significantly, the opinion was issued long before the aforementioned mental health 
movements that currently promote family and community-based treatment options. 
The claim in Joyner arose from a custody relinquishment statute in New York 
state that actively required parents to relinquish custody to the state “as a 
prerequisite to” receiving mental health services.108 The statutory scheme 
effectively regulated the practice of custody relinquishment, requiring the state 
social services agency to negotiate and draft a written voluntary transfer of custody 
agreement with the family.109 Additionally, a second requirement stipulated that a 
family court must approve any such agreement when the custody arrangement 
could last more than thirty days.110 
A class of plaintiffs, approximately 5,000 children, brought suit in federal 
court, alleging that the custody relinquishment practice constituted a violation of 
their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, both facially 
and as applied.111 The district court granted partial summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs, finding that the scheme “infringed [their] fundamental right to ‘family 
integrity’ . . . violating their substantive due process rights . . . ”112 
The court of appeals reversed, following a three-step substantive due process 
analysis, looking at: 1) whether the claimed right is fundamental under the 
																																																								
105 See, e.g., DLC INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 6; Gwen Goodman, Accessing 
Mental Health Care for Children: Relinquishing Custody to Save the Child, 67 ALB. L. 
REV. 301, 308 (2003). 
106 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983). 
107 See generally id. (applying a three-step test to guide substantive due process 
claims). 
108 See Goodman, supra note 105, at 310–12. 
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112 Id. at 772. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, 2) whether the state infringed that right, and 3) whether 
such infringement was justified by an important state interest.113 Significantly, the 
court first held that the right to family integrity, or “the right of the family to 
remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the 
state”114 was a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.115 The appellate court, 
however, disagreed with the district court’s finding that under a facial challenge 
this right had been infringed, for three specific reasons. First, the court did not see 
the New York statute as a relinquishment of the parents’ “right to rear their 
children,” because the voluntary transfer agreements protected those rights by 
defining “custody” narrowly.116 Second, the statute on its face declared its 
intention to be that of restoring families, once services were rendered.117 Third, the 
court pointed out that the scheme, on its face, was clearly “voluntary” and the 
parents ultimately had the right to choose whether to relinquish custody or not.118 
The court then remanded the case for further analysis of the as-applied claim, 
citing factual disputes to be resolved before the issue could be fully analyzed.119 
The as-applied analysis remanded to the district court subsequently went 
unresolved.120  
 
B.  Substantive Due Process As-Applied in Utah 
 
Several factors weigh against the state of Utah if a plaintiff were to attempt to 
revive substantive due process challenges today.121 First, there is an ever-
expanding and newly recognized right of those with mental disabilities to live at 
home and participate in their communities and families, as demonstrated by former 
president Bush’s executive order,122 cited in the foregoing discussion. This could 
motivate a court to recognize an as-applied due process violation where it was 
hesitant to do so before. The argument from Olmstead that integrated services are 
necessary to protect the integrity of the mentally disabled could be used to oppose 
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114 Id. at 777–78 (quoting Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
115 Id. at 778. 
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120 Goodman, supra note 105, at 314–15. 
121 See JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES TO PREVENT CUSTODY RELINQUISHMENT (on file with author) (speculating 
that, while constitutional challenges to custody relinquishment have not generally been 
successful, “more favorable outcomes may be possible in different courts and with very 
different facts”). 
122 See President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, Exec. Order No. 
13,263, 3 C.F.R. § 233–34 (2003). 
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states that allow custody relinquishment, as this fractures the child-family 
relationship and by extension threatens “family integrity.” 
Second, Utah’s failure to enact a statute regulating custody relinquishment 
could leave the state more vulnerable to an as-applied challenge. The analysis 
would proceed as set out above. First, the court would determine whether “family 
integrity” is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been 
held to be so.123  
Next, the court would need to determine whether the state infringed that right. 
The analysis here would diverge from Joyner, because a court would no longer be 
analyzing a statutory scheme on its face, but rather the actual practice of custody 
relinquishment as alleged by a potential plaintiff. The court in Joyner pointed out 
such facts as the narrow definition of “custody” in the statute, the fact that the 
facial intention of the statute was family preservation, and the facial provision that 
provided the custody transfer would be clearly “voluntary,” all in support of its 
rejection of the contention that the statute was facially invalid.124  
When addressed in Utah, however, the facial argument clearly fails because 
there is no statute, so a court would not be able to dispose of such a claim as easily. 
Further, where the court in Joyner was analyzing a statute meant to protect 
children from the abuses of the practice, Utah has affirmatively failed to enact such 
a statute or ban the practice in the thirty years since Joyner and the subsequent 
criticisms of custody relinquishment. This would likely balance a court 
unfavorably against the state in such a claim. 
To be sure, such an analysis would be intensely fact specific and consequently 
it is difficult to analyze without any specific case on hand. However, parents would 
theoretically need first to demonstrate that the state effectively forced them to 
choose between relinquishing custody or forgoing treatment. From there, one need 
only demonstrate that forgoing treatment is not an option, because the state would 
then be able to predicate a finding of neglect on the fact that the parents do not 
access proper mental health care for the child. With the very limited sources of 
community-based care currently narrowing parents’ alternative options, this lack of 
choice might be easy for parents to show. 
In sum, because access to community-based services is limited in Utah, 
leaving costly and lengthy inpatient and residential treatment options as the only 
choice for parents of severely emotionally disturbed children, it is likely that such a 
case exists in the state where the parents have virtually no choice but custody 
relinquishment. If such facts can be established and brought before a court, there is 
a strong possibility that an as-applied challenge will stand. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
While boasting a culture that is rich in family and community values, Utah 
ought to be leading the way in developing and implementing a comprehensive and 
efficient system of care that protects children and families by placing tools within 
the home and the community to strengthen these core units of Utah society. 
Further, with the Utah State Hospital at the end of its physical lifespan, and a 
crippled economy requiring more budget pinching than ever, the timing is 
particularly conducive to taking these crucial steps forward. With these litigation 
tools, an advocacy group or family might be able to successfully gain judicial 
support in the push to incentivize lawmakers to join the community-based services 
movement. 
